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FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW AND THE PURPORTED 
SHIFT AWAY FROM “EXCEPTIONALISM” 
Curtis A. Bradley∗ 
The field of “foreign relations law” encompasses a variety of con-
stitutional, statutory, and common law rules and doctrines that regu-
late how the United States interacts with the rest of the world.1  In 
their article on The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, Profes-
sors Ganesh Sitaraman and Ingrid Wuerth contend that there has been 
a revolution in U.S. foreign relations law during the past twenty-five 
years.2  In particular, they claim that there has been a shift away from 
treating foreign relations law issues as “exceptional” toward treating 
them as “normal” — that is, “as if they were run-of-the-mill domestic 
policy issues, suitable for judicial review and governed by ordinary 
separation of powers and statutory interpretation principles.” 3  The 
authors further contend that this trend of normalization is likely to 
continue, and that such a development should be welcomed and  
encouraged.4 
Normalization makes a number of important contributions.  It use-
fully seeks to develop a more rigorous definition of the idea of “foreign 
relations exceptionalism.”  It ties together various Supreme Court de-
cisions since the end of the Cold War that might otherwise have 
seemed unconnected.  Perhaps most notably, its critique of treating a 
general category of “foreign relations law” as legally distinct from a 
general category of “domestic law” is powerful and likely to have last-
ing significance.  Despite these virtues, the article has some conceptual 
and methodological limitations.  In particular, its definition of foreign 
relations exceptionalism is underinclusive in certain respects and 
overinclusive in others; its descriptive account is too exclusively fo-
cused on the Supreme Court and is not entirely persuasive even on its 
own terms; and its lack of an underlying theory weakens its empirical, 
predictive, and normative claims. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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 1 See generally CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
(5th ed. 2014). 
 2 See Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 
HARV. L. REV. 1897 (2015). 
 3 Id. at 1901. 
 4 Id. at 1904. 
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I.  CONTINUING UNCERTAINTIES  
ABOUT “EXCEPTIONALISM” 
At the heart of Normalization is a descriptive claim about the rise 
and fall of something called “foreign relations exceptionalism.”  The 
authors graciously credit me with coining the term, and they accurate-
ly note that I did not attempt to define the concept with much specific-
ity.5  Instead, I simply described it as “the view that the federal gov-
ernment’s foreign affairs powers are subject to a different, and 
generally more relaxed, set of constitutional restraints than those that 
govern its domestic powers,”6 and I argued that scholars often seemed 
opportunistic in their embrace or rejection of the concept.7 
Sitaraman and Wuerth seek to define foreign relations 
exceptionalism somewhat differently, and with more precision.  In par-
ticular, they propose to limit the concept so that it covers only differ-
ences in the treatment of domestic and foreign relations law that are 
based on “distinctive functional, doctrinal, or methodological analy-
sis,” and not “differences that emerge from standard analysis, such as 
constitutional text and original history.”8  In making this distinction, 
the authors seek to avoid having to consider and evaluate the extent to 
which the Constitution itself accords exceptional treatment to foreign 
relations law.  Under their approach, if “standard” constitutional in-
terpretation leads a court to conclude (for example) that the President 
has broad foreign relations powers, or that there should be differential 
treatment of statutes and treaties, “[t]his is not exceptionalism.” 9 
While Sitaraman and Wuerth’s effort to refine the concept of 
exeptionalism is commendable, the distinction they attempt to draw 
does not seem tenable.  As an initial matter, their definition of 
exceptionalism is underinclusive because assumptions about functional 
and other differences between domestic and foreign relations — as-
sumptions that the authors label as exceptionalist reasoning — perva-
sively affect “standard constitutional interpretation.”10  This phenom-
enon is especially evident in structural constitutional reasoning, which 
is one of the standard “modalities”  of constitutional interpretation.11  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 5 See id. at 1906.   
 6 Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1089, 1096 
(1999). 
 7 See Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Concep-
tion, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 557–61 (1999). 
 8 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at 1907. 
 9 Id. at 1908; see also id. (referring to “generally applicable analysis”); id. at 1969 (referring 
to “standard constitutional interpretation”); id. at 1975 (referring to “generally applicable consti-
tutional analysis” ). 
 10 Id. at 1969. 
 11 See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–17 (1991).  At times, 
Sitaraman and Wuerth appear to be assuming that “standard constitutional interpretation” is 
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To take one of many examples, when the Supreme Court stated in 
United States v. Belmont12 that “the external powers of the United 
States are to be exercised without regard to state laws or policies,”13 it 
was expressing a view about constitutional text, history, and structure, 
but its view about these materials was colored by a sharp conceptual 
distinction between domestic and foreign relations.  Similar observa-
tions can be made about the constitutional reasoning in other canoni-
cal foreign relations law decisions, such as Missouri v. Holland14 and 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.15  Tellingly, Sitaraman 
and Wuerth themselves frequently label examples of structural consti-
tutional reasoning as exceptionalist.16 
Sitaraman and Wuerth recognize this potential objection to their 
proposed definition of foreign relations exceptionalism, but they con-
tend that broadening the concept to include differential treatment that 
is the result of standard constitutional analysis “proves too much” be-
cause it would cause the concept to “ lose[] much of its usefulness.” 17  
It is not clear, however, why this is so: if nothing else, pointing out 
that the Constitution is being interpreted in foreign relations cases in 
ways that do not track how it is being interpreted in potentially analo-
gous domestic cases may place a burden of justification on those argu-
ing for such differential interpretation, especially if, as many scholars 
have argued in recent years, the dividing line between domestic and 
foreign relations has become blurred.18  In any event, by excluding 
from their focus the question of whether the Constitution should be in-
terpreted as treating foreign relations law exceptionally, Sitaraman and 
Wuerth are artificially excluding many of the core issues in the field. 
In a different sense, however, the authors’ proposed definition of 
exceptionalism is overinclusive, at least in the way that the authors 
apply it.  A court’s treatment of an issue of foreign relations law is not 
“exceptional”  as compared with its treatment of domestic law unless 
the issue is comparable to the domestic law issue.  But it is not clear 
that this is true for some of the authors’ examples of exceptionalism. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
limited to textualist and originalist reasoning.  See, e.g., Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at 
1907–08.  If so, it is not clear why they are making that assumption.  In any event, it is likely that 
textualist and originalist reasoning is affected by other modalities of constitutional interpretation.  
See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional 
Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 1213 (2015). 
 12 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
 13 Id. at 331. 
 14 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 15 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
 16 See, e.g., Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at 1915 (discussing Curtiss-Wright); id. at 
1915–16 (discussing Belmont); id. at 1916–17 (discussing Missouri v. Holland). 
 17 Id. at 1910. 
 18 That was, in fact, the thrust of my critique of exceptionalism in the 1990s.  See, e.g., Curtis 
A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 461 (1998). 
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For instance, the authors argue that deference to executive branch 
treaty interpretations should be subject to the precise requirements 
and limitations of the Chevron framework governing deference to 
agency interpretations of statutes.19  If the treaty context is not fully 
analogous to the statutory context, however, it would not necessarily 
be “exceptional” to apply a different deference regime to the treaty 
context.  In fact, the treaty context is not analogous in certain ways, 
such as in how the relevant text is developed (through executive 
branch–managed negotiation with other countries) and in the implica-
tions of adopting a particular interpretation (which, for treaties, inher-
ently involve international reciprocity considerations).20  Similarly, the 
authors suggest that it is exceptionalist to give more weight to histori-
cal practice in constitutional interpretation in the foreign relations area 
than in the domestic area.21  But part of the typical doctrinal test for 
crediting such “historical gloss” concerns whether Congress has acqui-
esced in the practice.22  If it turns out that Congress has acquiesced 
more in unilateral executive action in the foreign affairs area than in 
the domestic area — a possibility that the authors do not explore — 
one should see gloss having a more prominent role there, and that 
would not be exceptionalist. 
Sitaraman and Wuerth contend that, regardless of whether one 
agrees with their empirical and normative claims, their definition of 
foreign relations exceptionalism “is an independent contribution.”23  It 
turns out, however, that they are more successful in highlighting the 
conceptual uncertainties than in resolving them, and these continuing 
uncertainties make it more difficult to evaluate their other claims. 
II.  LIMITS OF THE DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT  
OF “NORMALIZATION”  
The descriptive claim in Normalization is that there has been a 
shift during the past twenty-five years toward “normalizing” foreign 
relations law — that is, toward treating it like ordinary domestic law.  
The authors describe this shift as occurring in three waves: in the im-
mediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, during the post–
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 19 See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at 1968–70.  
 20 See Curtis A. Bradley, Self-Execution and Treaty Duality, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 131, 157–60.  
It is therefore artificial to make a sharp distinction, as the authors do, between “a constitutional 
basis” for deference and the view “that the government offers expertise and accountability that 
the courts do not, making deference appropriate.”  Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at 1969. 
 21 See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at 1909. 
 22 See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Pow-
ers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 432 (2012). 
 23 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at 1902. 
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September 11 War on Terror, and during the Roberts Court.24  The 
methodology employed by the authors to support this claim is an ex-
amination of Supreme Court decisions from the past quarter-century.  
These decisions, the authors maintain, “form an unmistakable pattern 
of normalization across the most important debates in foreign relations 
law over the last century.” 25 
This Supreme Court–focused methodology is questionable, since 
most of foreign relations law is developed, interpreted, and applied 
outside the Supreme Court.  One may see much less “normalization” 
during the period in question by looking at the lower courts or political 
branch practice.  The political question doctrine, for example, has had 
a more vibrant life in the lower courts during the relevant period than 
in the Supreme Court, especially in cases touching on foreign rela-
tions.26  And, contrary to the views expressed in Normalization27 and 
separately by one of its authors,28 the lower courts have generally ac-
corded significant — and, indeed, often dispositive — deference to the 
executive branch with respect to whether to accord immunity to for-
eign officials.29 
Even on its own terms, however, the picture presented in Normali-
zation is less clear than the authors suggest.  For example, the authors 
describe the period following the September 11 attacks as witnessing a 
surprising and expedited turn to normalization in the judicial treat-
ment of foreign relations law, as evidenced most notably by the Su-
preme Court’s willingness to exercise judicial review over the execu-
tive detention and trial of alleged terrorists.30  But this is a highly 
contestable account of the Court’s decisions.  While the Court did in-
sist on the availability of judicial review over detainees held at the 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and required the President to obtain 
more specific statutory authority for military trials of the detainees, the 
Court otherwise left intact the executive branch’s “War on Terror” 
regime.  In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,31 for example, the Court accepted the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 24 Id. at 1919–35. 
 25 Id. at 1935. 
 26 See BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 68–69 (providing examples). 
 27 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at 1974–75. 
 28 See Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S. Courts: The Case 
Against the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 915 (2011). 
 29 See CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 263–64 
& n.185 (2d ed. 2015) (collecting cases).  The Supreme Court could be seen as having invited this 
deference when it noted in Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010), that courts had deferred to 
executive branch suggestions of foreign official immunity prior to Congress’s enactment of the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, see id. at 2285, and that the Supreme Court had “been given 
no reason to believe that Congress saw as a problem, or wanted to eliminate, the State Depart-
ment’s role in determinations regarding individual official immunity,”  id. at 2291. 
 30 See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at 1902–03. 
 31 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
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foundational premise of the Bush Administration’s approach, namely 
that the United States was in a “war” and that the authority conveyed 
by Congress in its post–September 11 authorization of force should be 
construed to encompass the “incident[s] of waging war.”32  Moreover, 
since Boumediene v. Bush,33 the Court has left the determination of 
the President’s detention authority to common law development in the 
D.C. federal courts, which have employed a broad and deferential ap-
proach to executive detention authority.34  The result is that the execu-
tive branch has been able to hold hundreds of individuals for years, 
mostly without trial, despite the fact that many of them are not formal 
members of any enemy armed forces.  Instead of seeing this period as 
one of “normalization,”  one might describe it as one of the more ex-
ceptional periods in the history of American law.35 
The picture with respect to foreign relations federalism since the 
end of the Cold War is also not as clear as the authors suggest.  In-
deed, two of the most significant federalism decisions in the period — 
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,36 and American Insurance 
Ass’n v. Garamendi37 — are notable for how exceptionalist they were 
in their willingness to infer preemption of state law.  Sitaraman and 
Wuerth emphasize the Court’s more recent decision in Chamber of 
Commerce v. Whiting,38 which held that an Arizona law relating to the 
licensing of state businesses that employ unauthorized aliens was not 
preempted by federal immigration law.39  But the more significant 
immigration decision in this period was Arizona v. United States,40 in 
which the Court held that a number of widely publicized Arizona 
measures relating to unauthorized aliens were preempted.41  Moreover, 
in reaching this conclusion, the Court invoked the exceptionalist deci-
sion Curtiss-Wright in support of what it described as the govern-
ment’s “inherent power as sovereign to control and conduct relations 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 32 See id. at 519 (plurality opinion).  For extended consideration of these incidents of war,  
see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terror-
ism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005).  The Hamdi plurality also endorsed minimal due process 
standards that were sensitive to the foreign relations context.  See 542 U.S. at 531–35 (plurality 
opinion). 
 33 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 34 See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 U.S. 866, 874–75 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 35 The Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have also largely abstained from reviewing 
U.S. government conduct in the War on Terror that takes place in foreign locations other than 
Guantanamo.  See, e.g., Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008) (U.S. transfer of custody in Iraq); Al 
Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (U.S. detentions in Afghanistan). 
 36 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
 37 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
 38 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). 
 39 Id. at 1973. 
 40 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 41 Id. at 2510. 
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with foreign nations.”42  While it is true that in Bond v. United 
States43 the Court applied a domestic federalism presumption to  
treaty-implementing legislation,44 it is also true that the Court resisted 
the temptation in that case to revisit what is often regarded as an 
exceptionalist decision, Missouri v. Holland.45 
The authors are on somewhat stronger ground in suggesting that 
there has been reduced deference to the executive branch during this 
post–Cold War period.  But even here the picture is mixed.  While the 
Court gave surprisingly little deference to the Bush Administration’s 
interpretation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,46 it subsequently accorded “great weight”  to the 
Bush Administration’s interpretation of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,47 and of the U.N. 
Charter in Medellín v. Texas.48  The Court again reaffirmed the pro-
priety of this sort of strong treaty deference in Abbott v. Abbott49 in the 
face of the dissent’s critique of it.50  Moreover, contrary to the sugges-
tion in Normalization,51 the Court’s disallowance in Medellín of execu-
tive branch preemption to enforce a non-self-executing treaty does not 
represent a dramatic blow to executive power.  As the Court empha-
sized, the executive action there was unprecedented.52  What was more 
noteworthy in Medellín was the Court’s articulation of a broad “non-
self-execution” approach to treaties that distinguishes them from the 
enforcement of federal statutes,53 an approach that many observers 
have criticized as unduly exceptional.54 
It is probably easiest to agree with the authors that the Court has 
had a narrower view of nonjusticiability limitations in recent years, 
with the Court’s refusal to apply the political question doctrine in 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 42 Id. at 2498. 
 43 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). 
 44 See id. at 2088–90. 
 45 See id. at 2087; see also Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at 1917 (noting that Holland 
“seemed to rest both on textual and exceptionalist grounds”); id. at 1928 n.173 (observing that 
Holland was “arguably” an exceptionalist decision). 
 46 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 47 548 U.S. 331 (2006). 
 48 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 49 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010). 
 50 See id. at 1993; id. at 2006–09 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 51 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at 1930. 
 52 See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 532. 
 53 See id. at 508–11. 
 54 See, e.g., John T. Parry, Response, Rewriting the Roberts Court’s Law of Treaties, 88 TEX. 
L. REV. SEE ALSO 65, 74 (2010) (“Medellín creates a different structure for treaties [than for 
statutes].”); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Less Than Zero?, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 563, 563 (2008) 
(“Medellín v. Texas is the first case in which the Supreme Court has denied a treaty-based claim 
solely on the ground that the treaty relied upon was non-self-executing.” (footnote omitted)). 
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Zivotofsky v. Clinton55 being a prime example.  (Indeed, it is hard to 
imagine Normalization being written if Zivotofsky had come out the 
other way.)  It is worth noting, however, that the Supreme Court rare-
ly applied the political question doctrine even before the purported pe-
riod of normalization, and it famously declined to do so in INS v. 
Chadha56 in 1983.57  Zivotofsky, moreover, presented a relatively unu-
sual situation in which the executive branch was asserting authority to 
disregard a clear statutory provision,58 something not presented in ear-
lier, “exceptionalist” foreign relations law decisions in which the Court 
had invoked justiciability limitations, such as Goldwater v. Carter.59  
The picture is also mixed with respect to other justiciability doctrines, 
and signs of “normalization” may partly be a function of the particu-
lar cases that make up a relatively small set.  In Clapper v. Amnesty 
International USA,60 for example, the Court applied a restrictive ap-
proach to standing in a case seeking to challenge the government’s 
electronic surveillance activities, noting that “we have often found a 
lack of standing in cases in which the Judiciary has been requested to 
review actions of the political branches in the fields of intelligence 
gathering and foreign affairs.”61 
I should emphasize that I am not claiming that all or even most of 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in this period prove exceptionalism  
rather than normalization.  My claim is simply that these decisions do 
not offer clear support for the supposedly revolutionary shift postulat-
ed in Normalization. 
III.  AN OBSERVATION IN SEARCH OF A THEORY 
The authors describe a purported normalization of foreign relations 
law, but they do not offer a theory about why it has happened.  They 
make clear that they “do not seek here to explain why normalization is 
taking place,”62 something that they say will be “left to another 
day.”63  In a paragraph in the introduction, the authors do note that 
they “have a number of hypotheses: the perception of reduced risk of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 55 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012). 
 56 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 57 See id. at 940–43. 
 58 See Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1424. 
 59 See 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.). 
 60 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
 61 Id. at 1147.  The Supreme Court’s reinvigoration in this period of the presumption against 
extraterritorial application of federal statutes could also be described as reflecting exceptionalist 
reasoning.  See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (ex-
pressing concern about the “danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign 
policy”). 
 62 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at 1905. 
 63 Id. at 1906. 
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negative foreign affairs consequences after the Cold War, scholarly at-
tacks on exceptionalist doctrine, the rise of the conservative legal 
movement, the Bush Administration’s overreaching legal arguments 
coupled with shocking uses of executive power, and the widespread 
acceptance of Chevron. ”64  But they do not return to these hypotheses. 
While no article should be expected to do everything, the lack of an 
explanatory theory presents particular problems for Normalization, 
both in its historical account of the rise and fall of foreign relations 
exceptionalism, and in its predictive and normative claims about fu-
ture directions of the law.  Consider first the authors’ account of the 
rise of foreign relations exceptionalism.  Without a theory about why 
the courts embraced exceptionalism, the authors end up portraying it 
as chiefly an implementation of the vision of Justice Sutherland, who 
authored two of the early “exceptionalist” decisions after having de-
veloped a strong conceptual distinction between domestic and foreign 
affairs in his writings before joining the Supreme Court.  The authors 
label this the “Sutherland revolution.” 65  But this label does not tell us 
why the other Justices went along with Justice Sutherland’s views, 
and why subsequent courts — over many decades — would have con-
tinued to express the same exceptionalist attitudes.66  Without a sense 
of the answer to those questions, it is difficult to evaluate the norma-
tive attractiveness of the exceptionalist period or the consequences of 
abandoning it.  This difficulty is compounded by the fact that 
Sitaraman and Wuerth generally avoid taking a position on whether 
the exceptionalist decisions were correctly decided. 
The lack of a theoretical framework also makes it more difficult to 
evaluate the authors’ empirical claim that there has been a revolution-
ary shift in foreign relations law away from exceptionalism.  As dis-
cussed above, the empirical case is uncertain even on its own terms.  
In evaluating the evidence offered in Normalization, it would be useful 
to have a sense of whether some underlying dynamic has changed.  If 
there has not been such a change, the pattern described in Normaliza-
tion may simply be (at most) the function of the particular cases that 
produced a relatively small number of Supreme Court opinions with a 
high degree of variance.  If some dynamic has changed, one might ex-
pect that there would still be some cases that would be paradigmatic 
foreign relations cases, and that these cases might continue to be treat-
ed exceptionally even if others are not.  For reasons discussed above, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 64 Id. at 1905–06. 
 65 Id. at 1911. 
 66 Nor does it tell us why there were exceptionalist decisions and reasoning long before Justice 
Sutherland’s opinions.  See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, 
Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
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this sort of variegated pattern may be a more accurate empirical pic-
ture than what is portrayed in Normalization.  Again, having a theory 
about what is purportedly occurring would make it easier to evaluate 
the evidence. 
For similar reasons, the lack of a theory is problematic for the au-
thors’ prediction of future judicial decisionmaking.  The authors “sus-
pect and predict” that the “stirrings of normalization” “are likely to 
be expanded to other areas of foreign relations law.”67  But this pre-
diction assumes some new underlying dynamic that will continue to 
exert a force on judicial decisionmaking.  There are a variety of possi-
ble explanations for the purported shift to normalization, however, 
that would not involve such a dynamic.  For example, if the shift to 
normalization was initiated because of a sense immediately after the 
end of the Cold War that foreign relations had become less dangerous 
and consequential, it is not clear why the shift should be expected to 
continue after the emergence of new threats, such as global terrorism 
and heightened geopolitical struggles with countries like Russia and 
China.  On the other hand, if part of what is going on is that a majori-
ty of the Supreme Court has become more “formalist” in its approach 
to constitutional and statutory interpretation,68 the trend may hold on-
ly so long as the composition of the Court remains the same, and it 
may produce normalization only when exceptionalism happens to con-
flict with formalism, which will not be true in all cases.  (To take one 
example, the formalist Justices were the ones who staked out (in dis-
sent) the exceptionalist position in Boumediene.69)  Alternatively, a po-
litical science account of judicial decisionmaking might suggest that 
the current Supreme Court’s willingness to restrain presidential au-
thority is related to political ideology, including the fact that President 
Obama is a Democrat and a majority of the Supreme Court consists of 
Republican appointees.  If so, the Court’s approach might change de-
pending on the next presidential election. 
Finally, the lack of an underlying theory weakens the authors’ 
normative claim that there should be additional “normalization” of 
foreign relations law and that “courts and scholars should embrace the 
normalization trend.”70  The authors view themselves, in contrast with 
other scholars, as making an “across-the-board normative assault on 
exceptionalism.”71  But without an account of why some areas of for-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 67 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at 1905. 
 68 See, e.g., Harlan Grant Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts 
Court, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 380 (2015). 
 69 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 826 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 827 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
 70 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 2, at 1905. 
 71 Id. at 1920. 
  
304 HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 128:294 
eign relations law have become normalized, it is difficult to know 
whether it would be desirable for additional areas to follow the same 
pattern.  Merely identifying a purported trend in the case law does not 
itself establish a normative case for extending that trend.  Again, if the 
phenomenon of normalization is a function of particular cases that 
have been decided by the Supreme Court in a particular period, it 
would not necessarily follow that we would see — or that we would 
want to see — the emergence of a uniform approach. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether or not one agrees with the authors’ claims, Normalization 
makes important observations about the direction of U.S. foreign rela-
tions law, at least as that law is interpreted and applied by the Su-
preme Court.  It also provides a useful counterpoint to the tendency 
among some scholars to generalize about the differences between do-
mestic law and foreign relations law.  Ultimately, however, the reader 
is left uncertain about what constitutes foreign relations 
exceptionalism, whether there has been a genuine shift away from it, 
why such a shift might have occurred, and whether it is normatively 
attractive. 
 
